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Introduction
When interacting individuals are related, the evolution
of intraspecific cooperation and altruism (collectively
referred to as helping, see later for a more formal
definition) is generally studied within the framework of
kin selection (Hamilton, 1964; Grafen, 1984; Taylor,
1992a; Frank, 1998; West et al., 2002). By contrast,
numerous theoretical models have been proposed to
account for how helping can evolve when individuals
are unrelated. In most cases the similarities and
differences between these models and their relationship
with kin selection models is obscure. In a recent paper
Sachs et al. (2004) proposed a useful hierarchical
framework to compare models, but they did not clearly
distinguish between helping behaviours that result in
positive effects on the direct fitness of the actor from
those that result in negative effects on the direct fitness
of the actor. For instance, it remains unclear in their
discussion whether the investment into helping of an
individual under direct reciprocation actually increases
or decreases its fitness (Sachs et al., 2004, p. 139). Here
we argue that such a distinction is useful because it
forces one to analyse the selective forces responsible for
the evolution of helping in terms of the two funda-
mental components of selection, i.e. direct and indirect
selection (Hamilton, 1964; Grafen, 1984). This is
illustrated by developing a simple conceptual frame-
work based on the analysis of a model, which allows
us to delineate the prerequisites necessary for the
evolution of intraspecific altruism and cooperation.
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Abstract
One of the enduring puzzles in biology and the social sciences is the origin and
persistence of intraspecific cooperation and altruism in humans and other
species. Hundreds of theoretical models have been proposed and there is much
confusion about the relationship between these models. To clarify the
situation, we developed a synthetic conceptual framework that delineates
the conditions necessary for the evolution of altruism and cooperation. We
show that at least one of the four following conditions needs to be fulfilled:
direct benefits to the focal individual performing a cooperative act; direct or
indirect information allowing a better than random guess about whether a
given individual will behave cooperatively in repeated reciprocal interactions;
preferential interactions between related individuals; and genetic correlation
between genes coding for altruism and phenotypic traits that can be identified.
When one or more of these conditions are met, altruism or cooperation can
evolve if the cost-to-benefit ratio of altruistic and cooperative acts is greater
than a threshold value. The cost-to-benefit ratio can be altered by coercion,
punishment and policing which therefore act as mechanisms facilitating the
evolution of altruism and cooperation. All the models proposed so far are
explicitly or implicitly built on these general principles, allowing us to classify
them into four general categories.
doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01119.x
The model is framed within the direct fitness
approach (Taylor & Frank, 1996; Frank, 1998; Rousset
& Billiard, 2000; Rousset, 2004). In the supplementary
material we further develop this model to explicit the
connections with classical approaches. Using this
framework, we clarify the relationships between avail-
able models and categorize them into a few broad
categories.
The model
In our model we first consider a large (infinite) and
unstructured (panmictic) population where individuals
interact in successive rounds of pair-wise interactions
(see supplementary material section for other demo-
graphic situations such as geographically structured
populations). We assume that the number of rounds of
interaction (1, 2, 3, …) for each individual follows a
Geometric distribution with parameter x, which desig-
nates the probability that an individual interacts again
with a partner after a round of interaction took place
(definitions of the symbols are given in Table 1). We
also assume that a focal individual (FI) can interact
with two classes of individuals. The first class, defined
as related, consists of those individuals that have a
positive probability of bearing genes identical in state
with those of the FI. The second class consists of those
individuals that have a lower probability of bearing
such genes. The probability of interacting nonrandomly
with an individual of the related class is denoted by x.
With complementary probability 1 ) x interactions
occur randomly with any member of the population.
All repeated rounds of interactions take place with the
same partner (see supplementary material for other
situations such as indirect reciprocity). During each
round of interaction the FI invests I• into helping with
I• varying between 0 and 1. This investment incurs a
cost CI• to the FI and generates a benefit BI•. A fraction
f of the benefit generated by helping directly returns to
the FI and the complementary fraction 1 ) f goes to
the partner. Both the costs and the benefits are
measured in terms of offspring produced. Accordingly,
helping may have divergent effects on the fecundity of
the FI and its partner. The effect on the FI’s fecundity
can be either positive or negative depending on the
value of fBI• ) CI• while the effect on the partner’s
fecundity (1 ) f)BI• is always positive unless the FI gets
all the benefits of its helping act (i.e. f ¼ 1) or does not
invest into helping (i.e. I• ¼ 0).
As the FI can interact with two classes of individuals
who may invest differently into helping, the fecundity of
the FI depends on the class of individuals with which he
interacts. The relative fecundity of the FI when inter-
acting with a class-j individual is given by
F;j ¼ 1þ
X
t
xt1ðBðfI;jðtÞþð1 fÞIj;ðtÞÞCI;jðtÞÞ ð1Þ
(see also supplementary material, eqn 8). In this eqn, 1
designates the relative baseline fecundity of an individ-
ual, I•,j(t) the level of investment of the FI into helping at
round t when playing against an individual of class j (i.e.
a member of the class of closely related individuals or a
random member of the population) and Ij,•(t) the level of
investments into helping of its partner at that round.
Taking the average of the fecundities over the different
classes of individuals determines the expected fecundity
of the FI and the fitness of the FI is then defined as the
expected number of offspring reaching adulthood
(Hamilton, 1964):
w ¼ xF;d þ ð1 xÞF;0
F0
: ð2Þ
This is the expected fecundity of the FI relative to the
expected fecundity (F0) of an individual randomly sam-
pled from the population. In the fitness function, F•,d
designates the fecundity of the FI when interacting with a
closely related individual and F•,0 is its fecundity when
interacting with a random individual in the population.
To study the dynamics of investment in helping, we
assume that the investment level into helping at a given
round depends linearly on the partner’s investment at
the preceding round (Wahl & Nowak, 1999a; Killingback
& Doebeli, 2002). Hence, the investment depends on
three traits: the investment on the first round s, the
response slope b on the partner’s investment for the
preceding round and the memory m (varying between
zero and one) of the partner’s investment at the
preceding round. The variable m can be interpreted as
the probability of not making an assignment error by
mistakenly considering that a partner has not cooperated
in the previous move when in fact he has (Ohtsuki,
2004). The two first traits (s and b) can evolve and the
dynamics of investment of the FI engaged in repeated
reciprocal interactions with a partner of class j then reads
I;jðt þ 1Þ ¼ mbIj;ðtÞ and Ij;ðt þ 1Þ ¼ mbjI;jðtÞ; ð3Þ
where the investments at the first round are given by
I•,j(1) ¼ s• and Ij,•(1) ¼ sj.
Solving the equations of the dynamics of investments
(see supplementary material) and substituting into the
fitness function w (eqn 2) allows us to determine the
inclusive fitness effect (Hamilton, 1964) and to establish
the direction of selection on the two evolving traits s
and b. In the direct fitness approach, the inclusive
fitness effect is calculated by considering the effects of
all ‘actors’ in the population (including the FI himself)
on the fitness w of the FI (Taylor & Frank, 1996;
Rousset, 2004). Accordingly, one counts the increment
(or decrement) in the FI’s fitness stemming from the
expression of the behaviour of all its relatives in
the population. Then, the inclusive fitness effect of the
initial move s reads as (see supplementary material
eqns 4, 13 and 14).
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DWIF ¼ fBþ ð1 fÞxmbB Cð1þ ðB CÞ  xmbÞð1þ xmbÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
c
þ r x½ð1 fÞBþ xmbðfB CÞð1þ ðB CÞ  xmbÞð1þ xmbÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
b
: ð4Þ
As in Hamilton’s (1964) framework, the inclusive
fitness effect is broken down into the fitness cost of
helping for the FI ()c) and the fitness benefits (b)
provided to partners of the related class multiplied by the
coefficient of relatedness (r) between the FI and individ-
uals of that class. The trait spreads when the inclusive
fitness effect is positive, that is when Hamilton’s
rule rb ) c > 0 is satisfied. Following Hamilton’s and
Rousset’s terminology, we categorize as cooperation
those cases where the act of helping is associated with
an increase in the FI’s direct fitness (i.e. when )c > 0)
and as altruism cases where helping is associated with a
decrease in the FI’s direct fitness (i.e. )c < 0). As we shall
see later, using cooperation and altruism as originally
defined by Hamilton is important because the different
conditions are required for the evolution of helping
when it results in positive vs. negative effects on the
direct fitness of the FI.
Because the inclusive fitness effect of the response
slope is proportional to eqn (4) (see supplementary
material eqns 13–14 and eqns 15–16) the same condi-
tions must be satisfied for the inclusive fitness effect of s
and b to be positive, i.e.
Table 1 List of symbols.
FI Abbreviation for focal individual
w Fitness of a focal individual defined as its expected number of offspring reaching adulthood. It is the fecundity of the
focal individual relative to the average fecundity in the population
I Level of investment into helping (varying between 0 and 1)
Ii,j(t) Level of investment into helping at round t of an individual of class i engaged in repeated interactions with an individual of class j
I•,j(t) Level of investment into helping at round t of the focal individual engaged in repeated interactions with an individual of class j
C Fecundity cost per unit investment into helping
B Fecundity benefit per unit investment into helping
)c Effect of the behaviour of the focal individual on its fitness
b Can be interpreted in two ways, either as the effect of the behaviour of the focal individual on the fitness of its related partner or
as the effect of the partner when bearing the same gene as the FI on the fitness of the FI
F Total relative fecundity of an individual resulting from the repeated reciprocal interactions with its partners
s Evolving level of investment into helping (varying between 0 and 1) on the first round
b Evolving response slope (varying between 0 and 1) on the partner’s investment at the previous round
a Evolving response slope (varying between 0 and 1) on the partner’s image score
z Generic designation of an evolving phenotype, here s, b or a
zj Average phenotype of an individuals of category j
z• Phenotype of the focal individual
zd Average phenotype of an individuals of the ‘related’ class
z0 Average phenotype of an individual randomly sampled from the population in a randomly mixing population or
from the focal group in a geographically structured population
V Proportion of the benefits generated by a helping act that directly return to the focal individual
x Probability that an individual interacts again with a partner once an interaction took place
m Probability that an individual knows the investment into helping of its partner at the previous move
q Probability that an individual knows the image score of its partner
x Probability that an individual interacts nonrandomly with an individual of the related class
a Probability that a individual interacts nonrandomly with another individual that bears the same genes at the altruistic locus
Qj Probability of genetic identity between pairs of homologous genes, one sampled from the FI and the other from a category j member
Q• Probability of genetic identity between two randomly sampled homologous genes in the FI. In haploid organisms Q• ¼ 1
Qd Probability of genetic identity between one gene sampled in the FI and another one sampled from the related class of individuals
Q0 Probability of genetic identity between one gene sampled in the FI and another one randomly sampled in the population but excluding the FI
r ¼ QdQ0QQ0 Coefficient of relatedness, which is a ratio of difference of probabilities of genetic identity
rb ) c > 0 Hamilton’s rule
N Group size
nd Number of groups (demes) in the population
di Dispersal probability at distance i
d0 Probability of staying in the natal patch d0 ¼ 1 
Pnd1
i¼1
di
 
s Survival probability of an adult to the next generation
k ¼ Nl
Nh
Relative population size, where Nl is the number of individuals in a deme of low density and Nh is the number of individuals
in a deme of high density
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fBþ ð1 fÞxmbB C|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
c
þ r x½ð1 fÞBþ xmbðfB CÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
b
> 0 ð5Þ
Inequality 5 allows us to delineate the different
conditions where cooperation and altruism are favoured.
Table 2 summarizes these conditions that will now be
discussed in detail in the next sections.
The evolution of cooperation
There are two general situations where helping can evolve
and the act is cooperative [i.e. in eqn (5) is satisfied and
)c > 0]. The first is when the FI gets some direct benefit
(i.e. f > 0) from its investment in helping. The other is
when the FI benefits indirectly from repeated interactions
with a partner who also invests in helping (i.e. xmb > 0).
Although both situations are not mutually exclusive, we
shall consider them separately for simplicity.
Direct benefits
When f > 0 helping can evolve even in the absence of
discrimination between more and less related individuals
(x ¼ 0) and in the absence of repeated interactions (x ¼
0) when the inequality
fB C > 0 ð6Þ
is satisfied. Helping is cooperative because the action
results in increased fitness for both the FI (by fB ) C) and
its partner (by (1 ) f)B). A similar result can be obtained
from models, which consider a situation where unrelated
individuals in a group equally share the benefits of a
cooperative act (Uyenoyama & Feldman, 1980; Nunney,
1985). In that case f is equal to 1/N where N is the
number of individuals in the group. Clearly, small group
size facilitates the evolution of cooperation when the
benefits are equally shared between group members. It is
important to note that when fB)C > 0 is satisfied helping
evolves simply because the FI increases its direct fitness
by performing such an act. This situation has also been
previously referred to as weak altruism (Wilson, 1979;
Sachs et al., 2004) or by-product mutualism (Brown,
1983). More recently it has been discussed under the
heading of ‘snowdrift game’ (Hauert, 2004).
There are several situations under which helping
generates direct benefits for the FI (i.e. f > 0). A classical
case is when individuals invest in communal activities
such as nest defence, nest building and group hunting.
While the benefits of such cooperation are usually shared
equally among all individuals in the group, the value of f
will also depend on the cooperative behaviour of other
group members when there are synergistic effects of
cooperation (Queller, 1985). The selective pressure on
helping is also expected to be high when the fitness of an
individual critically depends on its investment in cooper-
ation, for example if helping significantly increases
survival (Eshel & Shaked, 2001) or the chance of
inheriting a territory.
Repeated interactions and information
When individuals interact repeatedly (i.e. x > 0) helping
can evolve even if the FI gets no direct benefits from its
investment in helping (f ¼ 0) and in the absence of
discrimination between more and less related individuals
(x ¼ 0) when the inequality
xmbB C > 0 ð7Þ
is satisfied. In this case, helping is again cooperative
because )c > 0. Interestingly, when repeated interactions
occur with certainty (x ¼ 1) and individuals have a
perfect memory (m ¼ 1), in eqn (7) reduces to the
threshold theorem of Killingback & Doebeli (2002) when
individuals do not take into account their own invest-
ment in the previous move while interacting with their
Table 2 Classification of selective pressures promoting helping.
Helping
rb)c>0
fBþ ð1  fÞxmbB C|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
c
þr x ð1  fÞBþ xmbðfB  CÞ½ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
b
> 0ðeqn 8Þ
Cooperation Altruism
)c > 0 )c < 0
Direct benefits Reciprocation Kin selection Greenbeard
x ¼ 0 and r ¼ 0 f ¼ 0 and r ¼ 0 x ¼ 0 and f ¼ 0 x ¼ 0 and f ¼ 0
fB  C|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
c
> 0ðeqn 6Þ Direct reciprocity r xB|{z}
b
 C|{z}
c
> 0ðeqn 8Þ aB|{z}
b
 C|{z}
c
> 0ðeqn 9Þ here r ¼ 1
xmbB  C|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
c
> 0ðeqn 7Þ
Indirect reciprocity
xqaB C|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
c
> 0ðeqn 26 of the appendixÞ
The various situations encapsulated in eqn 8 of the main text and shown in Table 2 are not mutually exclusive, but we consider them
separately for simplicity.
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partner. This result emphasize that cooperation can
spread only if interacting individuals have an initial
tendency to be cooperative (i.e. b>0). At the other
extreme when x ¼ 0 cooperation can never evolve. In
order for cooperation to evolve, there must be a minimal
probability to interact again with the same partner and
this probability must be greater when the ratio C/B is
small (Friedman, 1971; Trivers, 1971; Axelrod &
Hamilton, 1981).
Several mechanisms may lead tom greater than zero. It
is common knowledge that humans have strong capacity
to keep track of the nature of their previous interactions
with partners as well as detecting cheating (Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2003). Experimental studies also revealed
that humans are more likely to cooperate with individuals
that have been cooperative in previous interactions (Fehr
& Fischbacher, 2003). These are the required conditions
for cooperation to evolve by direct reciprocity. While
direct reciprocity is certainly an important force under-
lying altruism in humans, its role in other organisms
is highly debated and probably of low significance
(Hammerstein, 2003; Stevens, 2004). One of the reasons
for this difference lies in the higher cognitive abilities of
humans that allows for a much higher m-value than in
other organisms. Good memory is for example crucial in
‘negotiation games’ where players exchange offers back
and forth in a negotiation phase until they converge to a
final pair of contributions (Taylor & Day, 2004).
In addition to the memory of a partner’s previous
moves, information on whether a given individual is
likely to be cooperative may come from its reputation
(Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). Here individuals have some
information on the overall level of cooperative tendency
of individuals they randomly meet for an interaction.
Accordingly, they can adjust their investment in
cooperation based on the reputation of their partner
and cooperation can evolve by indirect reciprocity
(Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). The difference between
direct and indirect reciprocity lies in the mechanism
underlying the evaluation of the cooperative tendency of
the partner. In the supplementary material, we derive a
model for the evolution of helping in the presence of
indirect reciprocity where reputation of the partner
depends on its image score and where assignment errors
can occur. The condition for the evolution of helping by
image score is then similar to that in eqn (7) with the
only difference that m describes the probability of
correctly assessing the partner’s reputation [i.e. likeli-
hood to know its social score, which is designated by q in
Nowak & Sigmund (1998), see Table 1 and eqn 26 in the
supplementary material]. In other words, the main
difference between direct and indirect reciprocity lies in
the source of information rather than a difference in the
type of selective force involved.
Whether or not repeated interaction leads to stable
cooperation is still unclear. Two cases can be distin-
guished. The first is when no errors occur in the
implementation of helping (i.e. m ¼ 1). In that case the
initial move and the slope converge respectively towards
s ¼ 1 and b ¼ 1 (Wahl & Nowak, 1999a). The optimal
strategy is thus to be generous on the first move because
it elicits cooperation in return. While simulations suggest
that such a strategy is stable and immune to the invasion
of cheaters (Wahl & Nowak, 1999a; Killingback &
Doebeli, 2002), analytical work seems to indicate that
this may not be the case when players interact long
enough (Lorberbaum, 1994). The second situation is
when errors occur. While it has been suggested that
direct reciprocity can then be stable (Lorberbaum et al.,
2002), this seems not to be generally the case. For
instance, in the direct reciprocity setting of Wahl &
Nowak (1999b), discriminator cooperative strategies can
invade defectors but when discriminator cooperative
strategies have reached a high frequency, nondiscrimi-
native cooperative strategies may emerge. This, in turn,
enables defectors to invade, resulting in a population that
cycles between cooperation and defection. The same
conclusion holds for indirect reciprocity when reputation
through image scores is based on individuals past actions
(Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). By contrast, sustained
cooperation over time seems possible under indirect
reciprocity when specific assumptions are made on the
distribution of the number of rounds of interactions
(Brandt & Sigmund, 2004) or when reputation is
modelled as standing, where an individual’s standing is
not negatively affected by refusing to provide help to
partners in bad standing (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003).
It is not clear why these different conditions lead to such
contrasting results, and more generally, whether coop-
eration can be stable with imperfect memory and a
limited number of interactions as is the case for most
natural systems.
The evolution of altruism
When )c < 0 (i.e. helping is altruistic as it is associated
with a decrease in the FI’s direct fitness but an in
increase in the direct fitness of individuals receiving
help), in eqn (4) can only be satisfied when there are
different kin classes in the population and helping is
preferentially directed toward individuals of the related
class (i.e. x > 0). In the following sections we will
differentiate two situations that differ depending on
whether the kin classes are defined on the basis of the
average genetic similarity over the whole genome
(genetic relatedness) or similarity at particular loci
(greenbeard effect).
Preferential interactions and helping between kin
When xr > 0, helping can evolve even if the FI gets no
direct benefits from its investment in helping (f ¼ 0) and
when there is no repeated interactions between individ-
uals (i.e. x ¼ 0) when the inequality
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xrB C > 0 ð8Þ
is satisfied. When x ¼ 1 (i.e. perfect discrimination
between more and less related partners), the inequality
simplifies to rB ) C > 0, which is the condition for the
spread of helping when altruistic acts are directed only
toward relatives. Because competition occurs at random
in the population, this situation represents the family-
structured model as originally envisioned by Hamilton
(1964). In eqn (8), xr measures the extent to which
individuals are more related in altruistic than in com-
petitive interactions, in line with the view that individ-
uals must be more related in altruistic than in
competitive interactions for helping to evolve when it
results in a net fecundity cost (Queller, 1994). Inversely,
when helping is provided irrespective of relatedness,
helping cannot be selected for unless it results in a direct
fecundity benefit, a result which usually holds whatever
the genetic structure of the population (Taylor, 1992b;
Rousset, 2004) (see supplementary material).
Several mechanisms may generate an x greater than 0.
The most common in nature is probably the use of spatial
cues with individuals expressing conditional altruism in
the natal nest or colony. Indeed most of the extreme cases
of altruism are found within families such as in social
insects (Keller & Chapuisat, 2001). A more active and
refined mechanism is phenotype-matching, with indivi-
duals being able to actively estimate their genetic
similarity by comparing their own phenotypic character-
istics with those of other individuals (Reeve, 1989). As
common genealogy generates phenotypic similarity for
genetically determined traits, each trait can be used as an
independent value to estimate average genetic identity.
This is a process of statistical inference with arbitrary
phenotypic traits being used as quantitative or qualitative
variables. Importantly, both spatial recognition and
phenotype matching lead to uniform genetic similarity
over the whole genome. Hamilton’s rule is then broadly
satisfied and there is no intragenomic conflict. In other
words, altruism is stable and immune to cheating (Seger,
1993). However, deception may occur when individuals
can circumvent the recognition mechanism. This may
occur when individuals succeed in infiltrating a foreign
family. An excellent example of this is social parasitism in
ants, where queens enter foreign established colonies and
secure help from the resident workers to raise their brood
of reproductive individuals. Importantly, however, these
cases of parasitism are expected to be relatively rare
because frequency-dependent selection on the recogni-
tion system of the hosts should maintain the rate of para-
sitism under check (Reeve, 1989; Axelrod et al., 2004).
Greenbeard effect
The other possible mechanism leading to altruism is
when preferential interactions between the FI and
related individuals at the helping loci are mediated by a
linkage disequilibrium between the gene encoding a
phenotypic trait used for recognition and the gene(s)
responsible for helping. Imagine the simple case of two
genes, one causing a specific phenotypic effect and the
other determining the level of helping and allowing its
bearers to determine whether or not other individuals
exhibit a specific phenotype expressed by the first gene.
Whether or not helping may evolve will depend on the
linkage disequilibrium between these two genes. In case
of perfect linkage, the situation is that of a greanbeard
gene, a concept invented by Hamilton (1964) and named
by Dawkins (1976). A greanbeard gene is defined as a
gene that causes a phenotypic effect (e.g. the presence of
a greanbeard or any other conspicuous feature) that
allows the bearer of this feature to recognize it in other
individuals, and results in the bearer to behave differ-
ently toward other individuals depending on whether or
not they possess the feature. If a haploid greenbearded
individual has a probability a to correctly identify
and preferentially interact with another greenbearded
individual investment into helping is selected when
aB C > 0 ð9Þ
is satisfied and one recovers the conditions described by
Hamilton (1975). Importantly, this inequality is similar to
in eqn (8), the parameter a being equivalent to x. The
coefficient of relatedness is equal to one here because the
probability of genetic identity at the altruistic locus is
one. This situation of preferential interactions between
individuals sharing the same altruistic gene is also
sometimes referred to as ‘assortative meeting’ models
(Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza, 1982). If recombination can
break down the linkage between ‘recognition’ and
‘altruistic’ genes, the situation become quite different
because altruism becomes intrinsically unstable. This
is because individuals with the gene conferring the
greenbeard phenotype but without the gene coding
altruism will have greatest fitness and there will be a
rapid decrease in frequency of the altruism gene. In
contrast, if the recognition and altruistic effects are the
product of a single gene or two completely linked genes,
a breakdown of the system can occur only after the
evolution of a new gene, which confers the greenbeard
but not response effect. In other words, greenbeard
systems should essentially be unstable over evolutionary
time, with rapid collapse if there are two genes and
recombination and significantly slower collapse when
the greenbeard and response effect are the product of a
single gene or two genes without recombination.
Cost and benefit of helping
In the previous sections we highlighted four situations
conducive to the evolution of helping. For each of these
situations, the condition required for helping to be
favoured is directly dependent on the cost to benefit
ratio (C/B) of this behaviour. The importance of this ratio
has been repeatedly recognized. For example, both the
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role of ecological factors and species-specific idiosyncratic
characteristics, which benefit altruism are all important
in promoting the evolution of reproductive altruism in
social insects. Thus, it has been suggested that the
presence of a sting and the raising of brood in a complex
nest are preadaptations responsible for the dispropor-
tionate number of eusocial evolution in Hymenoptera
(Seger, 1993). Similarly, living in a relatively invariable
and warm climate coupled with low annual mortality
possibly predisposes certain taxonomic lineages of birds
to cooperative breeding (Arnold & Owens, 1999).
Another central issue that has received increased
attention over the last decade is that the costs and
benefits of helping are not fixed variables since other
group members can actively alter them. This can occur by
coercion, punishment and policing (collectively called
punishment hereafter) which, in essence, imply that a
fine is imposed on defectors. As a result, the relative cost
of defecting becomes greater compared with the alternate
option of helping.
Numerous models of coercion, punishment and poli-
cing have been developed and they can be broadly
separated in two classes. The first class mainly conceives
punishment as a mechanism channelling the behaviour
of defectors toward higher levels of cooperation (Boyd &
Richerson, 1992; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Bowles
& Gintis, 2004). The general idea of these models is that
when individuals interact repeatedly, punishment is
selected because the ensuing cost is more than compen-
sated by the shift to cooperation of the partner. There are
several important assumptions in these models (Boyd &
Richerson, 1992; Bowles & Gintis, 2004). First, the
punishing and cooperative traits are frequently assumed
linked, constituting a so-called ‘strong reciprocator’ gene.
However, there is no a priori reason to assume that these
traits are linked. In fact, it is more likely that these traits
will be unlinked (Gardner & West, 2004) and simulations
suggest that cooperation is not stable when cooperation
and punishing can co-evolve (L. Lehmann & L. Keller,
unpublished data). The second and related assumption is
that these models assume that ‘strong reciprocators’ can
recognize and punish defectors conditionally. In other
words, these models are akin to greenbeard models with
helping behaviour being used as the ‘recognition cue’.
Accordingly, strong reciprocators are always harmful
towards defectors. It remains to be studied what the
consequences would be of allowing conditional expres-
sion of both cooperation and punishment as well as the
possibility of these two traits to evolve independently
with explicit gene dynamics.
The second class of models envisions punishment as a
mechanism suppressing selfish behaviour, which may
threaten group integrity and/or productivity (Clutton-
Brock & Parker, 1995; Frank, 1995; Reeve & Keller,
1997). This would, for example, be the case of a
behaviour that would increase the relative share of an
individual at a cost to overall group productivity. These
models show that punishment should co-evolve with
cooperation if the cost of being punished is sufficiently
high to make it a better option not to behave selfishly
and if the cost of punishment is smaller than the benefit
gained by the punisher in terms of increased group
productivity and survival. An important simplifying
assumption of these models is that individuals cannot
develop countermeasures or retaliate to punishment. It
would be of interest to determine the evolutionary
consequences of countermeasures and/or arms races
between conflicting parties on the stability of the pun-
ishment and cooperation.
This brief overview of models reveals that punishment
and other behaviours of that type have the potential to
influence the cost/benefit ratio of cooperative acts. These
behaviours can thus alter the social and demographic
conditions where cooperation may evolve. However,
these models are still in their infancy and it remains to be
studied whether their predictions would be altered if
some of their crucial assumptions were not fulfilled.
A classification of models of helping
Our general model revealed that there are four general
situations where helping is favoured. The first is when
the act of helping provides direct benefits to the FI that
outweighs the cost of helping (i.e. there are direct
benefits). In that case helping simply evolves because it
is associated with an increase of the direct fitness of the
FI. The second situation is when the FI can alter the
behaviour response of its partners by helping and thereby
receives in return benefits that outweigh the cost of
helping. In both situations, the helping act is cooperative
as it results in an increase of the fitness of both the FI and
its partners. A difference, however, is that in the first
situation the increase of the FI’s fitness is because of its
own behaviour while in the second situation it results
from the behavioural change induced in its partner(s).
The third situation conducive to altruism is when the FI
interacts and provides help to related individuals (i.e. kin
selection). In that case, Hamilton’s rule provides the
conditions when helping can evolve even when it is
associated with a decrease in the FI’s direct fitness (i.e.
when the act is altruistic). The fourth situation is a special
case of the third with, in this case, recognition and
helping being coded by two individual loci (i.e. green-
beard effect). In that case, helping can also evolve and
remain stable when the two loci are linked and the
conditions of Hamilton’s rule are fulfilled.
In this section we shall briefly review several models
proposed for the evolution of cooperation and altruism
and investigate whether they can be classified in the four
general categories outlined above or whether there are
other general selected forces that may select for
cooperation and altruism. We list in Table 3 a subset of
models selected on the criteria of representing to us
‘influential or original models’. This table reveals that all
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these models fall within one of the four general categories
at least once. Some models actually fall in several cate-
gories, and it is not always easy to disentangle the relative
roles of the forces promoting altruism or cooperation.
Four types of models deserve special attention in that
they have been proposed as providing new principles for
the evolution of cooperation and altruism. The first class
consists of ‘spatial structuring’ models (Nowak & May,
1992; Killingback et al., 1999). A close inspection of
these models shows that the actual selective force
operating in the system is generally kin selection. Thus,
in the simulations of Nowak & May (1992), altruists are
more likely to be surrounded by altruists than defectors
at the beginning of the simulation, with the effect that
altruists generally do better than defectors. In this
situation, altruism can be maintained as long as
individuals are more related in altruistic than in
competitive interactions, which are the conditions
required for kin selection to operate (Queller, 1994).
Hence, the heuristic eqn (p. 1725) of Killingback et al.
(1999) exactly gives Queller’s requirements for kin
selection to be effective.
Several demographic factors can sustain the spread of
an altruistic gene under ‘spatial structuring’ when
initially rare. Thus, overlapping generations have a
greater effect on the kin selected benefits of altruism
Table 3 Subset of models selected on the
criteria of representing to us ‘influential or
original models’.
References
Helping
Cooperation Altruism
)c>0 )c<0
Direct benefits Reciprocation Kin selection Greenbeard
Friedman (1971) +
Hamilton (1975) + +
Cohen & Eshel (1976) +
Wilson (1977) +
Uyenoyama & Feldman (1980) + +
Axelrod & Hamilton (1981) +
Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza (1982) + +
Vehrencamp (1983) +
Nunney (1985) + +
Queller (1985) + + +
Nowak & May (1992) +
Nowak & Sigmund (1992) + +?
Dugatkin et al. (1994) + +
Frank (1995) + +
Nakamaru et al. (1997) + +
Wilson & Dugatkin (1997) + +
Nowak & Sigmund (1998) +
Van Baalen & Rand (1998) +
Michod (1998) + +
Roberts & Sherratt (1998) +
Reeve et al. (1998) + +
Killingback et al. (1999) +
Taylor & Irwin (2000) + + +
Kokko et al. (2001) + +
Eshel & Shaked (2001) +
Aviles (2002) +
Killingback & Doebeli (2002) +
Pepper & Smuts (2002) +
Le Galliard et al. (2003) +
Bowles et al. (2003) + +?
Boyd et al. (2003) + +?
Traulsen & Schuster (2003) +
Axelrod et al. (2004) +
Panchanathan & Boyd (2004) +
Ohtsuki & Iwasa (2004) +
Taylor & Day (2004) +
Hauert (2004) + +
Pfeiffer et al. (2005) +
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than on kin competition (Taylor & Irwin, 2000) (see
supplementary material). Similarly, the capacity of the
population to expand as a consequence of helping can
facilitate the spread of altruism. This might occur when
the population remains unsaturated through environ-
mental and/or demographic stochasticity (Van Baalen &
Rand, 1998; Mitteldorf & Wilson, 2000; Le Galliard et al.,
2003) or when helping increases group survival or
carrying capacity (see supplementary material).
Realising that the actual force promoting altruism in
spatially structured models in kin selection is important
because it helps to identify the actual demographic and
biological processes promoting the trait. Frequently, it is
claimed that a new mechanism favouring cooperation or
altruism has been identified. However, what has usually
been found is a new situation (e.g. demographic or
environmental stochasticity, overlapping generations,
particular recognition mechanism) underlying higher
relatedness during cooperative rather than competitive
interactions. In the supplementary material we show that
it is possible to disentangle between components of direct
and kin selection in spatial structuring models and thus
to identify the selective forces promoting investment into
helping.
The second class of models are reproductive skew
models which include ecological, genetic and social
factors in a single explanatory framework and aim at
determining how these factors jointly influence the
apportionment of reproduction (reproductive skew)
among group members (Vehrencamp, 1983; Reeve &
Ratnieks, 1993; Reeve & Keller, 1995). In essence,
reproductive skew models delineate the possible repro-
ductive strategies available to a FI and define the
conditions under which the best strategy is to cooperate
and sacrifice part or all of its direct offspring production.
Importantly, all these models are based on the explicit
comparison of inclusive fitness of individuals adopting
alternate reproductive strategies. An analysis of these
models reveals that individuals will stay in the group and
forego direct reproduction only when such an act
provides either direct benefits (i.e. fB ) C > 0 and the
act is cooperative, for example because such a strategy
increases group survival or the probability of inheriting a
territory (Kokko & Johnston, 1999; Ragsdale, 1999) or
because individuals can increase the reproductive output
of related individuals (i.e. xrB ) C > 0 and the act is
altruistic; e.g., (Reeve & Keller, 1995; Reeve et al., 1998).
The third class of models are so-called ‘tag-recognition’
(Riolo et al., 2001) and ‘grouping’ (Aviles, 2002) models.
The tag-recognition system is when an altruistic gene is
partially linked to a tag that can be recognized by other
members in the population. In other words, these models
fall in the greenbeard category with incomplete linkage
between the altruistic and recognition traits. Realising
this is useful for at least two reasons. First, it would have
prevented confusion about the actual selective force at
work. Second, it would have helped to realise that the
system is not stable over time because the association
between the tag and altruistic genes is bound to decay
just as any greenbeard mechanism (Roberts & Sherratt,
2002). Similarly, the ‘grouping’ model leads to altruism
because altruistic individuals are more likely to group
and interact. This is once again a special case of a
greenbeard mechanism, which cannot be stable over
time. Indeed, selection should favour nonaltruistic indi-
viduals to preferentially associate with altruists. As a
result, the association between the altruist gene and the
recognition trait (in that case grouping behaviour) will
decay and altruism will disappear.
The final class of models to be discussed are the ‘group
selection’ models. The general idea of these models is to
use a multi-level selection approach to partition selection
into components of within group and between group
selection. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, group
selection models are not fundamentally different from
classical models and it is possible in every instance to
translate from one approach to the other without
disturbing the mathematics describing the net result of
selection, (see eqn A6 of the supplementary material)
(Hamilton, 1975; Grafen, 1984; Dugatkin & Reeve, 1994;
Frank, 1998; Rousset, 2004).
The transition from unicellularity to multicellularity is
a classical example used to exemplify the role of group
selection (Michod, 1998). Importantly, however, the
high level of cooperation between cells in a multicellular
organism can just as well be explained by kin selection
(Queller, 2000). Indeed, a key factor necessary for the
evolution of the highly cooperative nature of interactions
between cells is probably a high relatedness, which is
generally attained by multicellular organisms going
through a unicellular phase such as the egg stage
(Wolpert & Szathmary, 2002).
The other important selective force that operates in
many group selection models is cooperative action
providing direct benefits to the FI. A classical example
is Wilson’s (1977) model of random group formation
where cooperation evolves only so far that the direct
benefits to the FI exceeds the costs. Unfortunately,
in-group selection models it is not always easy to
determine the relative importance of relatedness and
direct benefits. This is particularly true in settings where
groups compete against each other and reproduce as, for
instance, in the stochastic corrector model (Szathmary &
Demeter, 1987). The difficulty with this class of models is
that the costs and benefits are functions of group
composition and growth rate, which are highly depend-
ent on interactions within and between groups. The
complexity of the situation makes it difficult to delineate
analytically the relative importance of kin selection and
direct benefits. But realising that the actual force
promoting cooperation under group selection is a com-
bination of kin selection and direct benefits allows us to
delineate more clearly the role of the factors promoting
or repressing cooperation and altruism.
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Conclusion
The conceptual framework developed here emphasizes
that there are four general situations conducive to
helping and that all models proposed so far can be
classified accordingly. Hence, cooperation and altruism
can evolve only when there are direct benefits to the FI
performing a cooperative act, repeated interactions with
direct or indirect information on the behaviour of the
partner in previous moves, preferential interactions
between related individuals and/or a linkage disequilib-
rium between genes coding for altruism and phenotypic
traits that can be identified. In the three later cases
helping evolves because there is a positive association
between individuals at the genotypic and/or phenotypic
levels. The other parameter of paramount importance is
the cost-to-benefit ratio of helping acts that can be
altered by coercion, punishment and policing. However,
because these later behaviours are costly they can evolve
and remain stable only when at least one of the four
general conditions necessary for the evolution of cooper-
ation and altruism is fulfilled.
The synthetic model we developed to study the
evolution of helping made several assumptions such as
dyadic interactions between individuals, reputation
dynamics dependent only on the previous move of the
partner, linear payoff stream, the cost and benefits of
interactions varying linearly with the intensity of helping
and independently of the number of interactions; and
evolution proceeding in an unstructured population held
at a constant size. Some of these assumptions are relaxed
in the supplementary material, where it is shown that
they do not affect our general conclusions. More gener-
ally, Rousset & Ronce (2004) recently studied the
inclusive effects of behavioural traits in complex demo-
graphies and an inspection of their eqn (23) reveals that
the conditions required for the evolution of helping can
always be broken down into direct and indirect effects on
the FI’s fitness resulting from its own behaviour and that
of various classes of relatives (see supplementary mater-
ial). In other words, we are not aware of situations
conducive to helping when at least one of our four
conditions is not fulfilled.
In the future it would be very useful if new models of
cooperation and altruism explicitly refered to these four
general principles. Using a general framework will help
to clarify the relationship between new and old models
and to classify different situations belonging to the same
mechanism. This will enable us to clearly determine
whether the mechanism in question allows stable
cooperation or whether it is likely to be unstable as in
the case where linkage between altruistic and recognition
genes decays over time. Finally, the use of a general
framework will also greatly help readers to determine the
originality of new models and whether or not they really
provide new insights on the forces promoting cooper-
ation and altruism in nature.
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